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"SOMETHING SMELLS FISHY":
THE GIULIANI ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORT
TO RID THE COMMERCIAL TRADE WASTE
COLLECTION INDUSTRY OF ORGANIZED CRIME
I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, New York City politicians and prosecutors joined
forces in a fight against the organized crime presence that had become
inextricably linked with many of the City's most lucrative industries. The
private waste collection industry ("the industry") in New York City was
one such target, which prosecutors believe had been controlled by the
Historically,
Genovese and Gambino crime families for decades.'
numerous small, local businesses dominated the industry, which has had a
long history of customer allocation conspiracies in restraining fair trade
competition.2 These conspiratorial agreements typically have involved
members of organized crime families, especially in metropolitan areas. 3
In the New York City region, the existence of racketeering involvement in
the industry resulted in very limited entry into the market by large national
carter companies. Meanwhile, the local carters treated customers as assets
to be bought and sold, and prices for collection of commercial trade waste
skyrocketed. Still, the industry's reputation for corruption and organized
crime involvement precluded customers from taking any action to improve
the situation. 6
During the 1990s, the corrupt history of the industry took a dramatic
turn when New York City, under the leadership of Mayor Rudolph
1. See Alexandra Marks, New York Foils Mob Influence With Rules, Regulations,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 23, 1997, at 11.
2. See Peter Reuter, The CartageIndustry in New York, 18 CRIME &JUST. 149, 149
(1993).

3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 162. In the late 1970s, public records demonstrated that the anticompetitive practices that arose during the 1950s (and eventually led to regulation) still
persisted. The carter businesses "treated [customers] as assets of the carters who serviced
them, and they were transferred between carters in open financial transactions that were
routinely approved by the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA), the industry's
regulatory agency." Id. at 159. Although the justification offered for the customer
transfers was that the original carter was selling the goodwill that had developed with the
customers, "the circumstances surrounding [the] individual transactions, as well as the high
and uniform prices paid, made clear that this was a pretense." Id.
6. See id. at 149.
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Giuliani, vowed to remove the "smell" from the industry. 7 The City had
privatized the industry in 1956, and in 1996-forty years later-"true
competition finally arrived in the nation's largest solid waste market." '
This change largely can be attributed to Local Law 42, enacted in 1996,
which created the Trade Waste Commission "to provide for the more
efficient and lawful conduct of businesses in the carting industry and to
protect the public interest" by overseeing the "licensing and regulation of
businesses in the carting industry.' Although the results of the law are
commendable, in that organized crime indeed has been extracted from the
industry, some Giuliani critics believe that a price has been paid for this
accomplishment-namely, the usurping of the civil liberties of the
accused.'°
This Note discusses Local Law 42 and some of the issues that surround
it. Part II of this Note orients the reader to the background of the law and
the reasons for its enactment. Part III describes the law itself, and Part IV
discusses the licensing of carters under the law. Part V explores the
constitutional challenges to the law and explains how these challenges
failed, as the law ultimately withstood judicial scrutiny. Part VI provides
one account that praises the law's effectiveness. Part VII summarizes some
of the criticism directed at the law and the mayor whose administration
enacted it. Finally, Part VIII briefly discusses other attempts by the
Giuliani Administration to rid City businesses of organized crime.
II.BACKGROUND
Throughout New York City's history, the business of collecting
commercial trade waste" traditionally has been handled by the private

7. See Jerry Adler, We'll Take Manhattan, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 1997, at 32.
8. Steve Daniels, Competition Comes to New York, WASTE NEWS, Apr. 21, 1997, at
10.
Local Law 42 of 1996, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 42, § 1 (1996).
See Richard Cohen, Safe-Streets Mayor, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1997, at A21.
Waste collection is different from waste disposal, and the opportunities for illegal
in each industry likewise differ. As Peter Reuter explains:
Waste collection (taking garbage from the generator to some other location
where it may be recycled, compacted, or disposed of) is not waste disposal
(providing a final destination for the waste, typically a landfill before 1980, now
increasingly incineration or other more technologically complex transformation).
Though some firms may provide both services, the vast majority do not. As

9.
10.
11.
activity
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sector. 2 The City's requirement that all commercial establishments hire
13
private carters to haul their refuse can be traced back to the late 1800s.
The only exception to this rule was a brief period during which businesses
in residential areas had their garbage collected by the City, free of charge. 4
As of 1956, however, the City mandated that all commercial
establishments, regardless of locale, contract with private waste hauling
5 A very lucrative
companies for removal and disposal of their
16 garbage.
policy.
municipal
this
from
industry arose
As one might imagine, the corruption that often accompanies the
potential for great profit began to permeate the commercial trade waste
collection business. ' During the mid-1950s, various investigations began
to reveal the infiltration of organized crime into the industry.'" In 1957,
the United States Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the
Labor or Management Field, chaired by Senator John McClellan,
conducted hearings on the industry in the metropolitan New York area. 19
At the time of the investigation, the industry earned approximately $50
million annually, servicing approximately 122,000 businesses and 500,000
private homeowners. 2' According to the record of these hearings, the
investigation sought to reveal that organized crime indeed had seeped into

environmental concerns have become increasingly important, disposal is now
usually either directly provided by local government or operated under contract
to such a government, reflecting the government's interest in having control of
the waste stream.
The opportunities for illegal activity in the two sectors are very different.
Local disposal markets are often monopolies, either natural (a uniquely
advantaged site in a congested area) or regulatory (only one license granted for
environmental reasons). Control of a disposal facility by a group of "carters"
(the term used here for the firms that collect solid waste) was one means for
limiting entry and competition in earlier eras; only carters who were in
compliance with a cartel agreement were allowed to bring their waste to a given
facility. Collection generates cartels rather than monopolies.
Reuter, supra note 2, at 151-52.
12. See Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985,
990 (2d Cir. 1997).
13. See id.
14. See id. The City eliminated this exception in 1956.
15. See id.
16. See id. ("Three hundred private carting companies service 250,000 commercial
accounts, removing more than 12,000 tons of commercial waste and recyclable materials
each day."). Id.

17. See id.
18. See ALAN A.
19. See id.
20. See id.

BLOCK, PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZING CRIME

82 (1991).
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the industry and was constructing "business empires in the private carting
industry through a system of monopoly enforced by trade associations and
cooperative labor unions." 2 ' After the hearings, Senator McClellan
concluded that "more than 46 hoodlums were found connected in one way
or another with the carting industry."'
The carter businesses involved were either sole proprietorships or
partnerships, and all were members of Local 813 of the Teamsters union,
the union that represented the carters.' The McClellan hearings led to the
indictments of Vincent Squillante, the principal racketeer directly involved
in the industry, and Bernard Adelstein, union president of Local 813.24
However, Squillante disappeared before his trial, and it is believed that he
was murdered; Adelstein's conviction in the trial court was overturned on
appeal.' Thus, some believe that the McClellan hearings "did little more
than help establish the bad reputation of the industry."2 That was 1957;
over time, the corruption continued.27
Nearly thirty years after Senator McClellan's revelations, the situation
in the industry had not improved.2 8 In 1987, the U.S. Department of
Justice conducted its own study of racketeering, which again revealed how
various private carters bought and sold the rights to service particular
customers, while internal disputes were arbitrated by the racketeers
themselves.29 This investigation, called the Rand Study,3" also found that
business owners frequently had no input in choosing a carter and were
forced to pay exceptionally high prices that often were falsely inflated. 3
In 1986, the New York State Assembly's Environmental Conservation
Committee suggested that organized crime had become so intricately linked
to the industry that eradicating its presence would require an exceptionally

21. Id. at 82-83 (stating that "the hearings focused on the activities of organized crime
figures and associates, including Vincent J. Squillante, Bernard Adelstein, Joseph Parisi

(who though dead in 1956 was important in the construction of the organized crime
conspiracy under investigation), and Nick Ratteni"). Id. at 83.
22. Id. at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted).

23. See Reuter, supra note 2, at 158-59.
24. See id. at 157.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 86 (stating that "it
is certain that the coercive elements in this industry
were and remain substantial"). Id.
28. See Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985,
990 (2d Cir. 1997).

29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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strict regulatory scheme-much stricter than the regulations in place at the
time.32
A few years later, the committee's suggestion was heard. The New
York City Police Department and the Office of the Manhattan District
Attorney, Robert Morgenthau, conducted an investigation into the inner
workings of the industry.33 In June 1995, seventeen individuals in the
industry were indicted, in addition to twenty-three carting companies and
four trade waste associations.3 4 The allegations ranged from monopolizing
the industry and artificially inflating prices, to allocating customers to
particular carters and threatening "outside" carters with murder and
arson. 35 These indictments indicated that the fishy smell of the industry had
turned into a stench. In 1996, the year after the indictments, two entities
emerged that would attempt to rid this prosperous business of its corruptive
elements: the Administration of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Local Law
42 of 1996.36
III. LOCAL LAW 42: AN OVERVIEW
On May 22, 1996, the Committee on Consumer Affairs met to discuss
the possibility of creating a trade waste commission "to regulate the
commercial carting industry in New York City[,]" which "ha[d] been
dominated for decades by a cartel, controlled by organized crime, which
ha[d] prevented competition among private carters., 37 Prior to the
proposal, commercial carters had been licensed by the Department of
Consumer Affairs38 pursuant to the New York City Administrative Code
(the "Code").39
The City Council (the "Council") held three hearings between
December 1995 and May 1996 to consider the new proposal. 40 The
hearings confirmed earlier findings of corruption in the industry for over
four decades, including the trade waste cartel formed by members of
organized crime groups and threats to those outside of such groups who

32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.

35. See id.
36. See id.
37.
208.

Report of the Committee on Consumer Affairs, N.Y. CITY LEGIS. ANNUAL, at

38. See id. at 210.
39. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 18 (1997).
40.

See Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985,

990 (2d Cir. 1997).
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attempted to enter the industry. 4 ' The Council recognized that customers
were being overcharged as a result of improper rate-making and charging
for the removal of quantities of waste that exceeded the amounts actually
being collected.4" Specifically, Manhattan District Attorney Morgenthau
estimated that $500 million of the revenue generated in the $1.5 billion-peryear industry had been comprised of cartel overcharges. 43 In addition, the
Council recognized the unequal bargaining power in contractual relations
between customers and cartel members, including the use of "evergreen
clauses" 44 and other onerous provisions. The presence of organized crime
in the industry also resulted in frequent criminal activity, such as violence
and threats of violence to both customers and competing businesses. 5 The
Council further deemed the "mob tax"46 paid by New York City businesses
"harmful to the growth and prosperity of the local economy.
These determinations, coupled with the 1995 indictments of cartels and
their members, prompted the Council to enact Local Law 42, which was
passed on June 3, 1996.48 The legislature stated the purpose of the new law
as follows: "Enactment of this chapter is intended to enhance the city's
ability to address organized crime corruption, to protect businesses which
utilize private carting services, and to increase competition
in the carting
49
industry with the aim of reducing consumer prices. )
The law took effect immediately, creating the New York City Trade
Waste Commission (the "Commission") to directly oversee the licensing,
registration, and regulation of the carters in the City." As prescribed by
the law, the Commission consists of the commissioner of investigation, the

41. See id. The proposal was introduced by members of the City Council, namely
Council Member Vallone (the speaker); Council Members Fisher, Koslowitz, O'Donovan,
Michels, Freed, Malave-Dilan, Henry, Dear, and Eristoff (by the request of the mayor and
public advocate); Council Members LeMer, Povman, Abel, Fields, Lasher, and Powell IV
were also present. See Local Law 42 of 1996, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 42
(1996).
42. See Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc., 107 F.3d at 990.
43. See id.
44. See id. An "evergreen clause" provides for automatic renewal of a contract from

term to term. See Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 928 F. Supp.
407, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
45. See Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc., 928 F. Supp. at 414.
46. See Donna Greene, HearingsBegin on Carting Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1997, Westchester edition, § 14, at I (describing "mob tax" as "the added amounts that

governments, businesses and individuals have to pay for garbage collection because of
organized crime's influence in the carting industry").
47. Local Law 42 of 1996, N.Y. COMP. CODESR. &REGS. tit. 42, § 1 (1996).

48. See id.
49. Id.
50. See Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc., 928 F. Supp. at 410.
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commissioner of business services, the commissioner of consumer affairs,
the commissioner of sanitation, and one other member who is appointed by
the mayor. 51 The powers of the Commission include the ability to establish
standards for the issuance of licenses to carters; 52 to establish minimum and
maximum rates for trash removal and disposal;53 to set standards for
service, including contracting, billing, and maintenance; 54 to investigate
matters that may arise in the course of its duties; 55 and to establish
programs for the education of customers learning about the industry and
their personal rights relating to that area.56
IV. CARTER LICENSING UNDER LOCAL LAW 42

Although all of the above duties of the Commission are noteworthy, its
control of the licensing process and regulation arguably has caused the most
commotion-both among applicants and in the courts. 7 That portion of the
statute makes it illegal for any individual or business to collect commercial
waste "without a license therefore from the commission. 58 Those carters
possessing licenses prior to the enactment of the law have been allowed to
continue to possess such licenses until an unspecified date to be set by the
Commission. 9 Should a licensee desire to renew the license within that
period, the prior license would remain effective until the Commission
renders a decision on the new application.6'
The Commission not only has the right, but the
61 obligation, to make an
informed decision on each application it receives. Under the statute, the
Commission may, after given notice and an opportunity to be heard, refuse
a license to any applicant who "lacks good character, honesty and
integrity."'62 The Commission must state the reasons for the denial of a

51. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 16-502 (1997). The Commission is currently
headed by attorney Edward Ferguson III. See Paul Moses, City Putting a Lid on Private
Trash Prices,NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 26, 1997, at A28.
52. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 16-504(a) (1997).

53. See id. § 16-504(b).
54. See id. § 16-504(d).
55. See id. § 16-504(f).
56. See id. § 16-504(g).
57. See Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 928 F. Supp. 407,
410 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
58. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 16-505 (1997).
59. See Local Law 42 of 1996, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &Regs. § 14(iii)(a)(2) (1996).
60. See id. § 14(iii)(a)(1).
61. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 16-504(a) (1997).
62. See id. § 16-509(a).
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license.'
The provision goes on to list possible bases for refusing a
license, including: (1) the existence of misstatements on a license
application; 64 (2) a pending indictment or criminal action against the
applicant, or a pending civil or administrative action that relates to the
applicant's ability to engage in such business;6' (3) the commission of
racketeering activity or association with those who have been convicted for
engaging in such activity; 66 and (4) association or involvement with
members of an organized crime group, as identified by federal, state, or
city law enforcement, when the applicant "knew or should have known of
the organized crime associations of such person." 67 From the array of the
above considerations, and others that may be determined by the
Commission, one can surmise that the new law makes it rather difficult for
"corrupt" individuals and entities to make their way over the licensing
threshold and into the industry. 6' As for those carter companies controlled
by organized crime, but already in the industry, Local Law 42 has made it
more burdensome for them not only to remain there, but to feel
comfortable and secure conducting their profitable, and often illegal,
business practices. 69
V. SANITATION AND RECYCLING INDUSTRY, INC. V. CITY OF NEW YORK:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE

70

Shortly after the enactment of Local Law 42, licensed carters in the
industry attacked the new law in every conceivable aspect by which they
might persuade the court to grant them relief. 7' The law was enacted on
June 3, 1996, and by the end of that same month, a challenge had been
brought against Local Law 42 in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.' In Sanitation and Recycling Industry,
Inc. v. City of New York,73 the plaintiffs, licensed carters, challenged the

63.

See id.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See id. § 16-509(a)(i).
See id. § 16-509(a)(ii).
See id. § 16-509(a)(v).
See id. § 16-509(a)(vi).
See Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 928 F. Supp. 407,

410 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

69. See id.
70.
71.
72.
73.

928 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See id. at 410.
See id.
Id.
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new law and sought relief on nine claims, which the court divided into
three categories. 74 The City moved for summary judgment.75
A. The Plaintiffs' Claims
The first category of the plaintiffs' claims focused on the four sections
of the law "enacted to cure the past effects of anti-competitive practices,
and eliminate those practices in the future by incorporating term limitations
into all contracts between carters and their customers. 76 Specifically, the
provisions included: (1) two-year limitations on all contracts; r (2)
termination of a contract by either party, effective thirty days after the
law's enactment, that would give such party the right to end the contract
upon thirty days written notice unless the carter receives a new license
from, or was granted a waiver by, the Commission; 78 (3) consumer rights
to nullify carting contracts that have been automatically distributed to
another carter, upon thirty days notice to the carter; 79 and (4) authority by
the Commission to exclude private carters from two test areas to be
established in the future." The plaintiffs claimed that these four clauses
conflicted with the United States Constitution in that they violated the
Contract, Takings, and Due Process Clauses.8 '
The next category of allegations focused on those sections of the law
that gave the Commission discretion to: (1) mandate that a licensee enter
a contract with an independent auditor; 2 and (2) grant a waiver regarding
that provision of the law that renders contracts concerning those denied
renewals terminable upon thirty days notice. 3 The plaintiffs cited the Due
Process Clause as a basis for this challenge, arguing that these practices
would not provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard before an

74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 412.
77. See id. (citing Local Law 42 of 1996, N.Y. COMP.

11(i), (ii) (1996)).

CODES R. & REGS. tit. 42,

§§

78. See id. (citing Local Law 42 of 1996, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &REGS. tit. 42, §
11(iii)(1996)).
79. See id. (citing N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 16-520(e)(ii) (1997)).
80. See id. (citing N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ 16-504(h), 16-523, 16-524 (1997)).
81. See id.
82. See id. (citing N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 16-511 (1997)).
83. See id. (citing Local Law 42 of 1996, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &REGS. tit. 42, §
11(iii) (1996)).
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administrative action is taken. 4 The plaintiffs also challenged the
provisions as "impermissibly vague."'85
Finally, the plaintiffs challenged a number of provisions in the law that
govern the type of information the Commission may use in assessing
applicants.86 These provisions allowed the Commission to access business
and financial records and to investigate possible indictments regarding trade
associations and organized crime." The plaintiffs proposed that such
information violated the constitutional right to privacy and freedom of
association.88
Before conducting a more thorough analysis of the plaintiffs' claims,
the court noted that the regulation of the industry has traditionally been a
police power, and as such the court should "respect the wide discretion"
given to the legislature in such an area. 9
B. The Court'sAnalysis of the ContractsClause Claim
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Contracts Clause of
the Federal Constitution should be a basis for granting relief on the
plaintiffs' first set of claims.'
In reaching this conclusion, the court
applied a balancing test, comparing the level of the impairment of
contractual relationships with the question of whether "legitimate and
significant purposes support the law. "9 Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument
that the impairment of contractual relationships permitted in "emergency
economic conditions" was inapplicable in this instance, 92 the court cited the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Energy Reserve Group, Inc. v.
Kansas Power andLight Company, 93 which held that the public purpose in
altering contractual relations "need not be addressed to an emergency or
temporary situation." 94 Examining the testimony presented at the
legislative hearings, the district court then concluded that the enactment of

84. See id.
85. See id. The Court found that the statute provided for other ways of preventing the
termination clause from taking effect, and, therefore, did not address this claim. See id.
at 419 n.7.

86. See id.
87.

See id. (citing N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ 16-508, 16-509, 16-520 (1997)).

88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 416.
91. Id. at 414.
92. Id.

93. 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
94. Id. (citing Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 928 F.
Supp. 407, 414 (S.D.N.Y.1996)).
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the law and its effects on contractual relationships withstood constitutional
attack, noting that the law sought to reinstate fairness in contracting and
that the 9City
Council selected a reasonable means to accomplish this
5
purpose.
C. The Court'sAnalysis of the Takings Clause Claim
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Takings Clause
should be a basis for granting them relief on their first set of claims.' The
plaintiffs argued that the Commission's activity pursuant to Local Law 42
constituted a "taking," since it "interferes with carters' reasonable
investment-backed expectations by denying them the economically viable
use of their contract rights."9 7 The City argued that this was not a
"taking," largely due to the legitimate state interest at hand, but also since
the plaintiffs were still able to use their property for economic gain.9"
The court agreed with the propositions advanced by the City in its
defense of the law. 99 Several factors led the court to conclude that the
law's enforcement would not constitute a "taking" for constitutional
purposes, namely:
(1) the speculative nature of any losses on the part of the plaintiffs,
(2) the fact that any losses will be less severe than the total or
nearly total loss of value required by the Supreme Court in
Takings cases, (3) the heavily-regulated nature of the carting
industry, and (4) the non-physical nature of the government action
100

Local Law 42 thus survived the second part of the constitutional
challenge. 10'
D. The Court's Analysis of the Due Process Clause Claims
The plaintiffs made four due process arguments. First, the plaintiffs
challenged the waiver provision and termination clause of Local Law 42,

95. See Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc., 928 F. Supp. at 416.
96. See id. at 418.
97. Id. at 416.

98. See id.
99.

See id. at 418.

100. Id.
101. See id.
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which allow either party to terminate the contract upon thirty days written
notice unless the carter receives a new license from the Commission. 2
Under the law, a carter may seek a waiver of this customer privilege, but
the Commission may deny the application with or without a hearing.0 3
The plaintiffs contended that this deprived them of their property-that is,
their preexisting contracts-without due process.'" Federal case law
indicates that in order to support a claim for deprivation of property, the
plaintiffs must demonstrate "that the statute could never be applied in a
constitutional manner." 1'° However, the court noted that the plaintiffs
could have bypassed the termination clause by obtaining a new license from
the Commission,0 6 and the new license application process entitles a carter
to be heard before a contract becomes terminable by a party. 0 7 Thus, there
existed alternative means of preventing the plaintiffs' contracts from
becoming subject to the law's termination clause, and the plaintiffs' first
due process argument failed to persuade the court. 03
Second, the plaintiffs argued that the two-year limit for contracting
deprived them of due process, since the limit divested them of their
property interests in any contracts that exceeded the time limit and lessened
the value of their businesses for sale or collateral purposes.'0 9
The court accorded no merit to these arguments on either procedural
or substantive due process grounds." 0 In response to the procedural due
process challenge, the court cited the "well-established" premise that a
"government's change in established policy, even if it works to an
individual's commercial detriment, does not create entitlement to a
hearing.""' Therefore, the legislature can act without considering the
implications for every individual citizen who may be affected."' In
response to the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim, the court found
that the City had legitimate justifications for implementing the law and its
provisions-including the two-year contractual limit-and as such the

102.
103.
104.

See id.
See id. at 419.
See id. (arguing that the alleged violation of due process stemmed from the

Commission's ability to reject plaintiffs' applications for waivers, thereby making
preexisting contracts become terminable at will after 30 days).
105. Id. at 418. (citing New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
1, 11 (1988)).

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 419.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 419-20.
See id. at 420.
Id. (citing O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 789 (1980)).
See id.
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plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the legislature had acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner. 13
The plaintiffs' third due process challenge involved the possible
appointment of an auditor to a carter as a condition of a license, on the
basis that the law does not afford the license applicant a hearing before the
Commission decides to appoint an auditor." 4 This due process challenge
failed as well, since the only purported "injury" suffered would be
supervision by an auditor, albeit at a carter's cost." 5 Thus, the property
interest of which the plaintiffs claimed to be deprived was simply the
opportunity to carry on business as it had prior to the law; it was not an
interest amounting to the kind of a property rights protected by the Due
Process Clause. "' The legislature's power to enact legislation in the public
interest thus trumped this claim." 7
In the fourth due process challenge, the plaintiffs contended that the
overbroad definition of "applicant"-specifically, the definition of
"principal"-violated their due process rights, since the definition had the
potential to impute wrongdoing to an "innocent" carter with an allegedly
"bad" principal." 8 In evaluating the plaintiffs' claim, the court applied a
"rational relation" test: "economic regulation passed pursuant to a local
government's police power need only be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose." 119 The court concluded that examining good
character is an essential element in eradicating organized crime from the
industry. 2 As the next Part illustrates, the court made a similar argument
in rejecting the plaintiffs' final constitutional challenge
based on the right
2
to freedom of association and the right to privacy.1 '

113.
114.

See id.; supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
See Sanitationand Recycling Indus., Inc., 928 F. Supp. at 420.

115. See id.
116.

See id.

117. See id. at 421.
118. See id. at 421-22. (The statute has broadened the definition of principal to
include any member of the entity applying for a license whose children, grandchildren, or
parents own in the aggregate 10% or more of the applicant entity.).
119. Id. at 422 (citing Hertz Corp. v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir.
1993)).
120. See id. (The court noted that such regulation would prevent individuals with
ownership interest in the entities applying for a license from evading the Commission's
investigation by simply transferring ownership to a relative.).

121. See id.
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E. The Court'sAnalysis of the Right to Freedom of Association and
the Right to Privacy Claims
The application for a license under Local Law 42 requires substantial
disclosure of information, including any information that could imply a
connection to organized crime, which the Commission may then consider
when deciding whether to grant a license.12 The plaintiffs challenged these
disclosure requirements as a violation of their rights to privacy and freedom
of association." 2 The court rejected this final argument for several
reasons. 124 First, the statute was designed to require disclosure of those
issues that relate directly to the purpose for its enactment."2 Second, the
court stated that "an individual's freedom of association may be curtailed
to further significant governmental interests, especially those seeking to
'eliminat[e] the public evils of crime, corruption and racketeering' from a
regulated industry." 26 Third, as a basis for striking down the plaintiffs'
freedom of association claim, the court applied a balancing analysis. 2 7 The
court held that so long as the disclosure requirement helps further a
government interest
28 and is not discriminatory in its administration, it will
be deemed valid.
F. Local Law 42 of 1996 Passes ConstitutionalMuster
The City was granted summary judgment. 129 The court noted that it
agreed with the plaintiffs' arguments that arguably "good" carters should
not have to suffer for the acts of the "bad.,, I3A However, the court viewed
the law as a means of protecting those carters who conduct business fairly.
It stated:
The surgery performed by Local Law 42 clearly was essential,
overdue and carefully tailored to protect the public interest with
measured consideration of the interests and welfare of those who
strive only for fair business conditions ... The public in interest

122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 423.
125. See id.
126. Id. (citing United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 941 F.2d
1292, 1297 (2d Cir. 1991)).
127. See id.

128. See id.
129. See id. at 424.

130. See id.
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required drastic corrections-the police power of the City provided
the means.' 31
Local Law 42 survived.
G. The Aftermath
The plaintiffs appealed their loss to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.132 However, they were denied their request for a
declaratory judgment on virtually the same grounds that the district court
had enunciated a year earlier.133 The lawsuits did not end there. Recall the
termination provision, which entitled either party to terminate a contract
after notice of thirty days. If a carter wished to prevent a customer from
terminating the agreement, it essentially had two options: (1) obtain a new
license from the Commission, which often was not an option for many
carters due to the aforementioned requirements; or (2) apply for, and
be
134
granted, a waiver of the termination provision by the Commission.
Since many applicants were denied the opportunity for a waiver, this
provision frequently has been litigated.' 35 The courts, however,
consistently have upheld the waiver provision and the denial of waivers to
carters. In three cases, Vigliotti Brothers Carting Company v. The Trade
Waste Commission of the City of New York,' 36 Universal Sanitation
1 37
Corporationv. The Trade Waste Commission of the City of New York,
and D & D Carting Company, Inc. v. City of New York, 138 the Commission
denied a waiver to each of the petitioner carting companies, and the courts
upheld the Commission's decisions. In each case, the petitioner company
had at least one employee who allegedly violated of section 16-509 of the
Code, which lists possible grounds for denial of a license, 39 including
pending charges, past criminal activity, and involvement with racketeering

131. Id.
132. Sanitation and Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985 (2d

Cir. 1997).
133. See id.
134. See Local Law 42 of 1996, N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. &REGS. tit. 42, § 11(iii)
(1996).
135. See, e.g., Universal Sanitation Corp. v. Trade Waste Comm'n of the City of
New York, 940 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Vigliotti Bros. Carting Co. v. Trade Waste
Comn'n of the City of New York, 648 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996); D
& D Carting Co. v. City, 658 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
136. 216 N.Y. L.J., Dec. 24, 1996, at 26 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
137. 940 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
138. 658 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997).
139. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 16-509 (1997).
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and organized crime. Decisions of administrative agencies are not to be
disturbed unless the agency's determination is arbitrary and capricious, or
lacks a rational basis.140 Thus, the court employed a test that required only
a "rational basis" for the denial of a waiver, and in most cases, the court
found that the connection was more than rational. 141
For example, in D & D Carting Company, each of the petitioner
carting companies engaged in dishonest trade practices, including the use
of evergreen clauses and routine overcharges. 142 Moreover, two of the
three petitioner companies had a president and sole shareholder that was an
officer of an indicted trade association, neither of which took "steps to
prevent its corrupt activities."' 4 3 In Universal Sanitation, the Commission
denied the plaintiffs' license applications due to the companies'
"questionable contracting practices" and the disreputable background of
Benny Villani, a principal of both companies, holding a controlling fifty-six
percent interest in one of the companies and a fifty percent interest in the
other.'" The Commission also noted "the pending racketeering charges
against Villani, his alleged affiliation and association with the Genovese
organized crime family, and plaintiffs' past contracting practices, which
included the use of 'evergreen clauses."" 45 Finally, in Vigliotti Brothers,
Arnold Vigliotti, the company's principal, was a defendant in a civil
racketeering case, in which he was accused of paying bribes to municipal
employees. 146 In addition, the company's president, Charles Vigliotti, and
Vincent J. Vigliotti, Arnold Vigliotti's uncle, were also indicted for
organized-crime activity. 147

140. See D & D Carting Co., 658 N.Y.S.2d at 828 (citing Pell v. Board of Educ. of
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 1, N.E.2d 321 (N.Y. 1974)).
141. See, e.g., Universal Sanitation Corp. v. Trade Waste Comm'n of the City of
New York, 940 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); D & D Carting Co., 658 N.Y.S.2d at 825;
Vigliotti Bros. Carting Co. v. Trade Waste Comm'n of the City of New York, 648
N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996).
142. See D & D Carting Co., 658 N.Y.S.2d at 827-28.
143. Id. Enrico Casagrande, president and sole shareholder of Green Bay Sanitation
Corp., and Anthony DiNardi, president and sole shareholder of O'Brien Sanitation Corp.,
both held positions as officers on the board of directors of an indicted trade association. See
id.
144. See Universal Sanitation Corp., 940 F. Supp. at 660.
145. Id. In June 1996, Villani and another carting company co-owned by him were
federally indicted on racketeering charges concerning their alleged participation in organized
crime, including conspiracies to commit extortion and antitrust violations in the waste
collection industry. See id.
146. See Vigliotti Bros., 648 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
147. See id. Charles Vigliotti, the petitioner company's president, was a vice
president of the Queens County Trade Waste Association from 1992 until 1996. This
association was indicted, and District Attorney Morgenthau charged the group with
enforcing illegal customer allocation and price-fixing schemes during those years. Vincent
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These lawsuits demonstrated the truth behind the long-speculated
connection between the industry and organized crime, as well as the
effectiveness of Local Law 42.
VI . ONE COMPANY'S WELCOME INTO THE INDUSTRY

"One month after my company, Browning-Ferris Industries, began to
compete for business hauling commercial waste in New York City, one of
our managers found the head of a large German shepherd under his
mailbox. 48 Taped in its mouth was a note that read, 'Welcome to New
York.'"1
These are the words of Philip Angell, vice-president of BrowningFerris Industries (BFI), a national waste hauling company. In the Wall
Street Journal, Mr. Angell praised the City for changing the corruptive
nature of the industry.149 In 1993, BFI assessed the New York market,
which at the time earned $1.5 billion annually.' When it decided to enter
the market, BFI soon realized the extent of criminal influence in the
industry after various acts of hostility toward BFI-including the incident
recalled above. Still, BFI remained steadfast and felt confident that it
would have a competitive advantage over the smaller local carting
companies. '' In fact, BFI stated that it lowered the monthly waste disposal
charge of its first customer, Columbia-Presbyterian Hospital, from
$100,000 to $40,000.152

Still, in the years prior to the enactment of Local Law 42, BFI had its
53
problems with the companies in the cartel that controlled the industry.
Although BFI believed that it could lower hauling rates for many City
businesses, potential customers were reluctant to abandon the carters that
were affiliated with the cartel. 154 According to Mr. Angell, BFI had only
200 customers in the summer of 1995, but possessed signed contracts from
over 500 companies that agreed to do business with BFI, but then decided

J. Vigliotti, Arnold Vigliotti's uncle, was also indicted after District Attorney Morgenthau's
prosecution of the organized crime cartel. The charges included "actively participating in
the indicted trade association's anti-competitive market allocation, and price-fixing scheme,
which, included the Queens County Trade Waste Association." Id.
148. Philip S. Angell, Editorial, Cleaning Up the City in More Ways Than One, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 16, 1996, at A16.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
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not to change carters after all. 155 Although it is unclear exactly what caused
this change of heart in the 300 or more potential BFI customers, Mr.
Angell believes that the members of the cartel undoubtedly influenced these
decisions, instilling fear into the customers. 15 6 The cartel had plenty to
lose, as New York City businesses were paying cartel
hauling companies
57
nearly $500 million in unnecessary overcharges. 1
Frustrated with the industry and its domination, BFI sought aid from
Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, and eventually allowed
an undercover agent to enter BFI to obtain information on organized crime
activity in the industry.' 58 The agent remained with BFI over the course of
the two-year investigation, and the results of the inquiry played a critical
role in the shocking 1995 indictments of many companies and individuals
in the industry, including those in the D & D Carting Company case
discussed earlier.' 5 9 These indictments, mentioned in Part II above,
confirmed the suspicion that organized crime controlled the industry, and
ultimately paved the way for Local Law 42.
BFI represents at least one business that believes the City has "cleaned
up" the industry, allowing City businesses "to enjoy the benefits of free
and open competition for this essential service.'
VII. CRITICISM: THE MAYOR, THE COMMISSION, THE INDUSTRY
A. The Mayor
Since the law's enactment, controversy has prevented it from being
deemed a success. Much criticism surrounds the Commission and the
mayor under whom it was created. Some argue that Mayor Giuliani, the
former United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York,

155. See id.
156. See id. ("One carter, for example, sent two large, intimidating men to stand
inside the door of a small deli on Wall Street every day for a week, disrupting business.
Another playfully put his hands around the neck of a small Korean woman who ran a
restaurant in Manhattan."). Id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See D & D Carting Co. v. City, 658 N.Y.S.2d 825, 828 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1997). In that case, however, it should be noted that the petitioners alleged that BFI itself
had engaged in its own share of wrongdoing; the courts, however, did not address such

allegations. See id.
160. Angell, supra note 148.
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continues to act more like a prosecutor than a mayor.' 6' His passion and
fervor when fighting organized crime in many New York City businesses
and institutions-discussed briefly in Part VIII below-has caused him to
be labeled "a touch mad,"' 62 "an enigma," "unlovable," and "Nixonian."16'
He has been accused of being ruthless when battling his foes. When one
reporter questioned him about this reputation, Giuliani responded: "Robert
Kennedy was constantly attacked for being ruthless. When I was a young
person, I could never understand that. He had an objective to achieve, and
as far as I could tell, he did it honestly but in a very strong way. And isn't
that what you want in a leader?' 64 For Giuliani's many supporters, the
answer is yes.
For others, however, Giuliani's tactics-regardless of the results
achieved-seem harsh and unfocused, in that the "good guys" may have to
suffer for the actions of the "bad."6s In short, some argue that in making
history for "cleaning up" many businesses that no mayor could clean up
before, the Giuliani Administration essentially has treated every
businessperson like a gangster, causing many non-criminal taxpayers to
lose their jobs. 166 As Peter Powers, a long time friend of the mayor,
explained: "To understand Rudy Giuliani, you just gotta see a guy focused
on results. You either like the way he gets there or you don't. 67
B. The Commission
The Commission also has been criticized. As one critic put it, the
Commission is "running roughshod in an unprecedented exercise of power
designed to destroy the approximately 200 remaining small carting
businesses that have never been convicted or indicted of any crimes."'

161. See Mark Kriegel, Lame Duck Can't Work to Heal City, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.),
Nov. 3, 1997, at 6 ("[T]he fact is, almost a decade after leaving the U.S. Attorney's Office,
Rudolph Giuliani still acts like a prosecutor. Not only does he need the bad guys; he needs
to make them big and organized, part of a grand conspiracy, larger than life.").
162. See Richard Cohen, Safe-Streets Mayor, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1997, at A21
("[The mayor of New York] is a bundle of petulance and grievances, a workaholic who,
like the city itself, seems never to sleep. New Yorkers can go to bed assured that Rudolph
Giuliani will not. He is out there, in Gotham, chasing down the bad guys-and they
include, of course, his political foes.").
163. See Martha Sherrill, Rudy Giuliani Is a Colossal Asshole, ESQUIRE, Oct. 1,
1997, at 74.
164. Id.
165. See Kriegel, supra note 161.

166. See id.
167. See Sherrill, supra note 163.
168. See Gerald Padian, FairnessTrashedinNew York, WASTENEWS, Oct. 20, 1997,
at 8.
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Some believe that the Commission has been denying licenses or renewals
to small, family carters with little or no proof of organized crime
affiliation. 69 According to one reporter, in late 1997, "one big gangstercarter with no indictments and all of two trucks went out of business after
only half a century." 70 John Isabella of the Bronx, who owns a small
carting company, fears the same will happen to him.' As of November
1997-a year and a half after Local Law 42 took effect-Isabella still had
not been granted a permanent license from the Commission."
His
business was at a standstill and, according to Isabella: "I can't buy a new
truck, can't invest in a business if I don't know if [the Commission is]
going to give me a license. I don't know how they can do this. It's a
complete mystery. We've never committed a crime, never been
indicted. " "
In fact, many small carting companies insist the Commission is not
rendering its licensing decisions quickly enough.' 74 According to Gerald
Padian, an attorney for many of the small carters, the Commission has
stalled for nearly two years in granting licenses to approximately 140 small
carting companies. 7 5
C. The Industry
As for the state of the industry, the market remains "highly
fragmented" and, as of 1997, no one company had more than five percent
of the City's 250,000 commercial customers. 7 6 Over 300 carters, most of
them with no more than five trucks, continue to operate. Nearly 350
carters have applied to the Commission for relicensing.177
Although the cartel seems to have vanished after Local Law 42, the
frequent sales of the smaller carting companies to the larger, national firms,
suggests that the industry is once more consolidating. The consolidators
are mainly the three national waste collection companies currently in the
market: Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., Waste Management, Inc., and

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
7, 1998,
175.

176.

See Kriegel, supra note 161.

Id.
See id.
See id.

Id.
See Juan Gonzales, New Cartel Cashingin on Trash, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), July
at 10.
See id.

See Steve Daniels, Competition Comes to New York, WASTE

1997, at 10.
177. See id.

NEWS,

Apr. 21,
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U.S.A. Waste Services, Inc. 7 ' As of 1997, these companies already
controlled over half of the transfer capacity in179the City, and some believe
that this percentage will continue to increase.
In fact, two years after the enactment of Local Law 42, some of the
people who fought the old mob cartel claim that a new monopoly of
national carting firms is again driving up the price for trash removal.
Critics contend that the industry is in the hands of a new cartel, one that
"wears suits" and "is traded on the stock exchange." 180 Specifically, the
greatest concern of the small carter businesses is the recent 1998
announcement of a planned merger between Waste Management, Inc., the
largest trash-hauling company in the country, and U.S.A. Waste, Inc., the
third largest waste hauling company.' 8 ' Since the merger was announced,
prices for dumping at waste transfer stations around the City have already
risen over ten percent. 18 2 Although Waste Management officials deny that
the price increases are related to the merger, the Commission is examining
the reasons behind the augmented fees.183 Before taking effect, the merger
must be approved by the United States Department of Justice, which may
require the merged company to divest some of its assets in order to escape
antitrust violations.' 84 In a letter to United States Attorney General Janet
Reno, Brooklyn Borough President Howard Golden, who opposes the
merger, wrote that the merged entity will have control over seventy-two
percent of the City's transfer-station capacity, thus "exchanging organizedcrime control for monolithic corporate control." 85
The City is currently working with the Department of Justice to
determine if the merger complies with antitrust regulations. 186 The merger
also must be approved by the Commission as part of the licensing rules.
Although prominent City officials, like Borough President Golden, oppose
the merger, some cite to the Giuliani Administration's "record of warm
87
embraces for big business" as a sign that the merger may be approved.
Only time will tell.

178. See id.
179. See id.
180.

Bob Liff, GarbageBiz Deal Gets Dirty Looks in Boro, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.),

May 4, 1998, at 2.
181. See Gonzales, supra note 174.

182. See id.
183. See id.
184.

See Philip Lentz, Back to GarbageCartel? Giants to Merge; Prices May Jump

Here, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Mar. 16, 1998, at 1.
185. Gonzales, supra note 174.
186. See Bob Liff, supra note 180.
187. Id.
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The criticisms summarized above represent just a few problems and
concerns revolving around Local Law 42 and its impact on the industry as
well as the City. Still, Giuliani's supporters contend that the law has been
a necessary evil in a city where prosperity invites corruption, and that
Giuliani still "has a quality they seek" in a leader.'
VIII. CLEANING UP THE CITY IN OTHER AREAS

Local Law 42 of 1996 was not the only law passed during the Giuliani
Administration that was designed to oust organized crime from City
businesses. The Fulton Fish Market (the "Market"), the largest fish market
89
in the country, conducts more than $1 billion of business each year.1
Profits allegedly had dropped by two-thirds over the past fifteen years due
to organized crime's control of the Market. " According to Giuliani,
organized crime took a percentage of all transactions related to the Market,
including transactions involving the small unloading companies that met the
wholesale trucks as they arrived. 9 ' It is believed that the Market has been
controlled by the Genovese crime family dating back to 1919, when Joseph
"Joey Socks" Lanza set up the Sea Food Workers' Union. 92 Since that
time, the Market has been haunted by organized crime. As Giuliani
explained:
You just couldn't.. . simply do business here without paying the
Genovese crime family. They were into every business, taking
money from every business. They've had influence over some of
the union operations. They've created jobs that aren't necessary
so that people have to pay. They have also used it as a front for
conducting other criminal activities. 93
The Giuliani Administration charged that these corrupt practices resulted
in price fixing and shakedown schemes, as well as acts of physical
violence, damage to property, and theft. 94

188. Richard Cohen, supra note 162.
189. See Ben Macintyre, FishMarket Is Gutted as FBI Closes Net on New York Mob,
TIMES (London), Mar. 31, 1995.

190. See id.
191. See 60 Minutes: A Fine Kettle offish (CBS television broadcast, Feb.18, 1996)
(Ed Bradley speaking).

192. See Macintyre, supra note 189.
193. 60 Minutes: A Fine Kettle offish, supra note 191 (Rudolph Giuliani speaking).
194. See id. (Melissa Block speaking).
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The Giuliani Administration sought to remedy the situation at the
Market. On June 15, 1995, Mayor Giuliani approved Local Law 50 of
1995,195 which was designed "to amend the administrative code of the city
of New York, in relation to the regulation of the Fulton Fish Market
distribution area and other seafood distribution areas.'96 Like the licensing
of trade waste carters, the law requires the licensing of those conducting
business at the Market. As one commentator described it, the law was "a
little bill that carried a big stick. It allowed the City to invoke its rights as
landlord. It could determine who it wanted in the market, who had the
character, the integrity to do business here."'197 Although some people
claimed that the law erroneously labeled all companies conducting business
at the Market as the "bad guys, 1 98 it was hard to dispute that many of the
businesses were involved in organized crime. In fact, just two days after
one of the preliminary City Council hearings on corruption at the Market,
a fire blazed through one of the Market's main buildings.'99 Although an
organization of businesses and individuals working at the Market brought
a federal lawsuit to strike down Local Law 50 on the grounds that it
violated the state and federal constitutions, the court summarily dismissed
the action, holding that the law's license and registration procedures were
within the police power of the City.2'
The Giuliani Administration contended that the mob's stronghold on
the Market extended even to the parking lots at the back end of the Market,
where a group of companies controlled where retail buyers parked their
vehicles.2 1 In 1997, in A & J Parking Corporation v. Giuliani,2 °2 the
commissioner of the City's Department of Business Services, acting

195. See N.Y. CITY LEGIS. ANNUAL, at 250. At the preceding meeting of the New
York City Council, held on May 31, 1995, 49 Council members voted for the law, while

only one member opposed it. See id.
196.
197.

Local Law 50 of 1997, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. (1995).
60 Minutes: A Fine Kettle of Fish, supra note 191.

there are criminals operating in the market, the city has an obligation
198. See id. "If
to prosecute them. But no one has a right to label as corrupt an entire class of workers
because someone alleges that some of them may be dishonest." Id. (Frank Mineo,
President of Smitty's Filet House, speaking).

199. See id. Authorities determined that the cause of the fire was arson, and the
ensuing investigation revealed that the fire was set in an area where records were kept-a
possible indication that someone was attempting to destroy the documents. See Macintyre,
supra note 189.
200. See Committee to Save the Fulton Fish Market, Inc. v. City of New York, 1996
WL 376984, at *3 (July 3, 1996).
201.

See 60 Minutes: A FineKettle ofFish, supra note 191. These loading crews [at

the parking lots] collect substantial amounts of money for allowing people the privilege of
parking on city streets and city lots." Id. (Randy Mastro, Mayor Giuliani's Chief of Staff,
speaking).
202. 217 N.Y. L.J., Feb. 3, 1997, at 28 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Feb. 3, 1997).
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pursuant to Local Law 50, rejected an application for the owners of a
parking lot at the Market. The last permit issued to the plaintiffs had
expired in 1983, and the City was free to deny continuation of the business.
Despite the plaintiffs' arguments, the City was granted summary judgment
in the ensuing lawsuit and the permit was denied. 3 According to the
court, the property in question fell under the New York City Charter's
definition of "waterfront property," which is exclusively controlled by the
Department of Business Services. 2°4 The court also allowed the City to
amend its answer to add a res judicata defense based on a decision in
Crivelli & Crivelli v. City of New York,2 °s which was rendered three days
after the City served its answer. The Crivelli court determined that various
businesses, including the plaintiffs in A & J Parking Corp., did not have
any right to occupy market locations, and cited to the questionable
backgrounds of the companies involved.2 6 The owners of the plaintiff
company also possessed two seafood distribution companies, both of which
were denied licenses by the Department of Business Services. 0 7
There were other victories over organized crime throughout the City.
In 1992, the City ousted some of the organized crime presence from
Manhattan's Garment District (the "District"). Thomas and Joseph
Gambino, of the Gambino crime family, pleaded guilty to violations of the
antitrust laws, paying tremendous monetary fines and agreeing to leave the
District.208 Their operation previously controlled the trucking of shipments
to and from the Garment District, and grossed $70 million while netting
them $22 million in personal profits.20 9 The Gambinos pleaded guilty to
the charges in 1992, and by 1995, the cost of shipping apparel had dropped
twenty percent. 1 0
At Manhattan's Jacob K. Javits Convention Center (the "Center"),
organized crime had long influenced the Center's business activity. The
labor pacts between the unions-which were allegedly run by organized
crime-and the exhibition firms often cost companies exhibiting at the

203. See id.
204. See id. (citing N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 52 § 1150(7)(b) (1989)).
205. Index No. 122645/95 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 26, 1996).
206. See id.
207. SeeA &J Parking Corp. v. Giuliani, 217 N.Y. L.J., Feb. 3, 1997, at28 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County Feb. 3, 1997).
208. See Greg B. Smith, Breaking the Mob's Back, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), May 5,
1998, at 5.
209. See Jerry Capeci et al., Mob Has-Beens and Wanna-Bes: Crackdown PutsBosses
in Prison and Cuts Power over Unions, DAILY NEws (N.Y.), May 3, 1998, at 30.
210. See Smith, supra note 208.
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Center from four to fifty times more than exhibiting in other cities .2 " As
a result of these overcharges and frequent payoffs, would-be exhibitors
took their business to other cities, and the Center lost money.2 2 However,
since the Center is publicly owned, those in control of the Center could rely
on the taxpayers "to subsidize the operation, and patronage and plunder
could continue as usual." 21 3 In 1995, Mayor Giuliani addressed a New
York State Senate committee hearing on the Center.21 4 The meeting was
designed to eradicate the corruption within the labor unions that worked at
the Center.21 5 After these hearings, the state labor committee terminated
the employment of many of those associated with organized crime, and by
1997, the Center was making a profit and turning away exhibitors,
including some who said their costs of doing business at the Center had
dropped ten percent.2 6
The mob's influence even extended to City entertainment. For many
years, the Genovese crime family controlled the City's largest street
festival, the Feast of San Gennaro on Mulberry Street in Little Italy. The
Genovese family allegedly received "rent" from each vendor who wished
to participate in the fair. Now, after several indictments and the
establishment of an independent monitor to oversee the festival, the City
boasts that the festival is free of corruption.21 7
In addition, strides have been made in the construction industry.
Teamsters Local 282, a union controlled by organized crime, delivered
concrete for use in construction sites across the city. With each
transaction, Local 282's leaders received a "kickback." However, in 1995,
five union officials pleaded guilty to racketeering charges. As a result,
experts estimate that construction costs across the city have declined ten
percent.
IX. CONCLUSION

Mayor Giuliani's efforts to expel organized crime from lucrative New
York businesses have extended from the trade waste removal industry to
the Fulton Fish Market, from the San Gennaro Feast to the Garment
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District. He has attempted to clean up a city that has been saturated with
organized crime for decades, and it appears that he has succeeded. Some
of us may never have reason to come into direct contact with some of these
"cleaned up" industries. It is likely that most of us will never have reason
to contract with a private trash hauling company, nor to make arrangements
to exhibit at the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center. Still, there has been
a positive impact on the City itself. For example, William Stern, a former
head of the City's Urban Development Corporation, observed that the
estimated $300 million that had been organized crime's "take" from the
trash-hauling industry was an indirect tax on everything bought and sold in
the city. 219 Perhaps the past influence of organized crime may have
affected us more than we realized.
Although some critics argue that the civil rights of the innocent have
been sacrificed to expose the guilty, Giuliani's popularity has not wavered.
A 1997 poll demonstrated that sixty-two percent of New Yorkers approve
of what Giuliani is doing in office.Y0 Although some criticize his often
ruthless tactics in battling organized crime, after the smoke clears what is
left is a New York City that is safer and more productive than before.2 2'
In a 1997 reelection speech, Giuliani vowed to extract the corruption from
even more City businesses: "With the confidence that we have turned the
city around in so many ways together, we must be vigilant in facing
organized crime in all its remaining forms as well ....We must continue
to move forward instead of turning back the clock to the policies of the
past. "'
Mayor Giuliani will continue to "clean up" city businesses. It is just
a matter of time before he "smells something fishy" in yet another New
York industry.
MarissaL. Morelle
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